A Stackelberg Game Approach to Control the Overall Load Consumption of a Residential Neighborhood
arXiv:2306.10935 · doi:10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10383468
Abstract
This paper formulates a Stackelberg game between a coordination agent and participating homes to control the overall load consumption of a residential neighborhood. Each home optimizes a comfort-cost trade off to determine a load schedule of its available appliances in response to a price vector set by the coordination agent. The goal of the coordination agent is to find a price vector that will keep the overall load consumption of the neighborhood around some target value. After transforming the bilevel optimization problem into a single level optimization problem by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we model how each home reacts to any change in the price vector by using the implicit function theorem. By using this information, we develop a distributed optimization framework based on gradient descent to attain a better price vector. We verify the load shaping capacity and the computational performance of the proposed optimization framework in a simulated environment establishing significant benefits over solving the centralized problem using commercial solvers.