Mixed Fair Division: A Survey
arXiv:2306.09564 · doi:10.1613/jair.1.15800
Abstract
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.
arXiv commentAppears in the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Senior Member Presentation Track, 2024
References in corpus (25)
- Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions
- Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation
- The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods
- Fair Division of Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods
- Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven
- On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations
- Envy-free cake division without assuming the players prefer nonempty pieces
- Envy-free Relaxations for Goods, Chores, and Mixed Items
- Computing Welfare-Maximizing Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
- How to Fairly Allocate Easy and Difficult Chores
- The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting
- Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
- New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores
- Fair Allocation of Two Types of Chores
- Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
- Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores
- Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences
- Approximability Landscape of Welfare Maximization within Fair Allocations
- Randomized and Deterministic Maximin-share Approximations for Fractionally Subadditive Valuations
- Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share
- Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting
- Towards Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Envy-freeable Allocations
- A Complete Landscape for the Price of Envy-Freeness
- Tree Splitting Based Rounding Scheme for Weighted Proportional Allocations with Subsidy
- Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting