Freedom in the many-worlds interpretation
arXiv:2210.07596 · doi:10.1007/s10701-024-00802-5
Abstract
I analyze the possibility of free-will in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), arguing for their compatibility. I use as a starting point Nicolas Gisin's "The Multiverse Pandemic" (preprint arXiv:2210.05377, after Gisin, N., "L'épidémie du multivers", in "Le Plus Grand des Hasards", Belin, Paris, 2010), in which he makes an interesting case that MWI is contradicted by our hard to deny free-will. The counts he raised are: (1) MWI is deterministic, forcing choices on us, (2) in MWI all our possible choices happen, and (3) MWI limits creativity, because everything is entangled with everything else. I argue that each of these features of MWI is in fact compatible with more freedom than it may seem. In particular, MWI allows compatibilist free-will, but also free-will very much like the libertarian free-will defined by Chisholm. I argue that the position that alternative choices exist as possibilities does not make sense from a physical point of view, but MWI offers a physical ground for alternatives.
To appear in Foundations of Physics
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