Community Formation in Wealth-Mediated Thermodynamic Strategy Evolution
arXiv:2206.13160 · doi:10.1063/5.0105969
Abstract
We study a dynamical system defined by a repeated game on a 1D lattice, in which the players keep track of their gross payoffs over time in a bank. Strategy updates are governed by a Boltzmann distribution which depends on the neighborhood bank values associated with each strategy, relative to a temperature scale which defines the random fluctuations. Players with higher bank values are thus less likely to change strategy than players with lower bank value. For a parameterized rock-paper-scissors game, we derive a condition under which communities of a given strategy form with either fixed or drifting boundaries. We show the effect of temperature increase on the underlying system, and identify surprising properties of this model through numerical simulations.
20 pages, 7 figures
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