Nash Equilibrium Seeking for General Linear Systems with Disturbance Rejection
arXiv:2110.08844 · doi:10.1109/TCYB.2022.3195361
Abstract
This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with perfect and imperfect information, respectively. Different from existing algorithms based on gradient dynamics, by introducing the integral of gradient of cost functions on the basis of passive theory, the rules are proposed to force the strategies of all players to evolve to Nash equilibrium regardless the effect of disturbances. The convergence of the two strategy-updating rules is analyzed via Lyapunov stability theory, passive theory and singular perturbation theory. Simulations are presented to verify the obtained results.
arXiv commentThis work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication
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