paper

Zealotry and Influence Maximization in the Voter Model: When to Target Zealots?

arXiv:2008.10012 · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-40943-2_10

Abstract

In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter model in the presence of biased voters (or zealots) on complex networks. Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget who aims at maximizing its influence over the system target zealots? Our analysis, based on both analytical and numerical results, shows a rich diagram of preferences and degree-dependencies of allocations to zealots and normal agents varying with the budget. We find that when we have a large budget or for low levels of zealotry, optimal strategies should give larger allocations to zealots and allocations are positively correlated with node degree. In contrast, for low budgets or highly-biased zealots, optimal strategies give higher allocations to normal agents, with some residual allocations to zealots, and allocations to both types of agents decrease with node degree. Our results emphasize that heterogeneity in agent properties strongly affects strategies for influence maximization on heterogeneous networks.

12 pages, 5 figures. This is a pre-print of a contribution published in Complex Networks XI, Springer Proceedings in Complexity 2020 (editors: Barbosa H., Gomez-Gardenes J., Gonçalves B., Mangioni G., Menezes R., Oliveira M.) published by Springer, Cham

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