Near-Optimal Reinforcement Learning with Self-Play
arXiv:2006.12007
Abstract
This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct supervision. In a tabular episodic Markov game with states, max-player actions and min-player actions, the best existing algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium requires steps of game playing, when only highlighting the dependency on . In contrast, the best existing lower bound scales as and has a significant gap from the upper bound. This paper closes this gap for the first time: we propose an optimistic variant of the \emph{Nash Q-learning} algorithm with sample complexity , and a new \emph{Nash V-learning} algorithm with sample complexity . The latter result matches the information-theoretic lower bound in all problem-dependent parameters except for a polynomial factor of the length of each episode. In addition, we present a computational hardness result for learning the best responses against a fixed opponent in Markov games---a learning objective different from finding the Nash equilibrium.
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- A Sharp Analysis of Model-based Reinforcement Learning with Self-Play
- Minimax Sample Complexity for Turn-based Stochastic Game
- The Power of Exploiter: Provable Multi-Agent RL in Large State Spaces
- Towards General Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Markov Games
- Provably Efficient Algorithms for Multi-Objective Competitive RL
- Model-Free Learning for Two-Player Zero-Sum Partially Observable Markov Games with Perfect Recall
- Online Learning in Unknown Markov Games