paper

A model for the competition between political mono-polarization and bi-polarization

arXiv:2003.02904 · doi:10.1063/5.0004996

Abstract

We investigate the phenomena of political bi-polarization in a population of interacting agents by means of a generalized version of the model introduced in PRE E 101, 012101 (2020) for the dynamics of voting intention. Each agent has a propensity in to vote for one of two political candidates. In an iteration step, two agents and with respective propensities and interact, and then either increases by an amount with a probability that is a nonlinear function of and or decreases by with the complementary probability. We study the behavior of the system under variations of a parameter that measures the nonlinearity of the propensity update rule. We focus on the stability properties of the two distinct stationary states: mono-polarization in which all agents share the same extreme propensity ( or ), and bi-polarization where the population is divided into two groups with opposite and extreme propensities. We find that the bi-polarized state is stable for , while the mono-polarized state is stable for , where is a transition value that decreases as decreases. We develop a rate equation approach whose stability analysis reveals that vanishes when becomes infinitesimally small. This result is supported by the analysis of a transport equation derived in the continuum limit. We also show by Monte Carlo simulations that the mean time to reach mono-polarization in a system of size scales as at , where is a non-universal exponent.

18 pages, 8 figures

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