paper

Adaptive Approaches for Fully Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Networked Games

arXiv:1912.00415

Abstract

This paper considers the design of fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for multi-agent games. To develop fully distributed seeking strategies, two adaptive control laws, including a node-based control law and an edge-based control law, are proposed. In the node-based adaptive strategy, each player adjusts their own weight on their procurable consensus error dynamically. Moreover, in the edge-based algorithm, the fully distributed strategy is designed by adjusting the weights on the edges of the communication graph adaptively. By utilizing LaSalle's invariance principle, it is shown that the Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable by both strategies given that the players' objective functions are twice-continuously differentiable, the partial derivatives of the players' objective functions with respect to their own actions are globally Lipschitz, the pseudo-gradient vector of the game is strongly monotone and the communication network is undirected and connected. In addition, we further show that the edge-based method can be easily adapted to accommodate time-varying communication conditions, in which the communication network is switching among a set of undirected and connected graphs. In the last, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

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