Leftover hashing from quantum error correction: Unifying the two approaches to the security proof of quantum key distribution
arXiv:1809.05479 · doi:10.1109/TIT.2020.2969656
Abstract
We show that the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach and Renner's approach to proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) are essentially the same. We begin our analysis by considering a special case of QKD called privacy amplification (PA). PA itself is an important building block of cryptography, both classical and quantum. The standard theoretical tool used for its security proof is called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL). We present a direct connection between the LHL and the coding theorem of a certain quantum error correction code. Then we apply this result to proving the equivalence between the two approaches to proving the security of QKD.
20 pages, no figure. v2: Typos and minor technical errors corrected; presentation improved. v3: Comparison with the previous literature added, references added, and typos and minor technical errors corrected
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Cited by in corpus (9)
- Simple security analysis of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
- Security framework for quantum key distribution with imperfect sources
- Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory
- Refined finite-size analysis of binary-modulation continuous-variable quantum key distribution
- Satellite-based communication for phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
- Phase error rate estimation in QKD with imperfect detectors
- Security loophole in error verification in quantum key distribution
- Security proofs for practical QKD: variations, techniques, gaps, and limitations
- Equivalence of three classical algorithms with quantum side information: Privacy amplification, error correction, and data compression