Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
arXiv:1805.12185
Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide excellent performance across a wide range of classification tasks, but their training requires high computational resources and is often outsourced to third parties. Recent work has shown that outsourced training introduces the risk that a malicious trainer will return a backdoored DNN that behaves normally on most inputs but causes targeted misclassifications or degrades the accuracy of the network when a trigger known only to the attacker is present. In this paper, we provide the first effective defenses against backdoor attacks on DNNs. We implement three backdoor attacks from prior work and use them to investigate two promising defenses, pruning and fine-tuning. We show that neither, by itself, is sufficient to defend against sophisticated attackers. We then evaluate fine-pruning, a combination of pruning and fine-tuning, and show that it successfully weakens or even eliminates the backdoors, i.e., in some cases reducing the attack success rate to 0% with only a 0.4% drop in accuracy for clean (non-triggering) inputs. Our work provides the first step toward defenses against backdoor attacks in deep neural networks.
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- Entangled Watermarks as a Defense against Model Extraction
- TrojDRL: Trojan Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning Agents
- Design of intentional backdoors in sequential models
- Walling up Backdoors in Intrusion Detection Systems
- Light Can Hack Your Face! Black-box Backdoor Attack on Face Recognition Systems
- Helen: Maliciously Secure Coopetitive Learning for Linear Models
- How to Inject Backdoors with Better Consistency: Logit Anchoring on Clean Data
- Towards Practical Watermark for Deep Neural Networks in Federated Learning
- WAFFLE: Watermarking in Federated Learning
- Baseline Pruning-Based Approach to Trojan Detection in Neural Networks
- Hacking Neural Networks: A Short Introduction
- Scientific Calculator for Designing Trojan Detectors in Neural Networks