Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics

Abstract

This paper is based on the complete classification of evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process with two strategies given by Taylor et al. (B. Math. Biol. 66(6): 1621--1644, 2004). Their classification is based on whether each strategy is a Nash equilibrium and whether the fixation probability for a single individual of each strategy is larger or smaller than its value for neutral evolution. We improve on this analysis by showing that each evolutionary scenario is characterized by a definite graph shape for the fixation probability function. A second class of results deals with the behavior of the fixation probability when the population size tends to infinity. We develop asymptotic formulae that approximate the fixation probability in this limit and conclude that some of the evolutionary scenarios cannot exist when the population size is large.

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Cited by in corpus (1)

• More can be better: An analysis of single-mutant fixation probability functions under $2\times 2$ games