The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the wN limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the Nw limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the Nw and wN limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the Nw and wN limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

arXiv comment36 pages, 3 figures

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Cited by in corpus (9)

• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection
• Transient amplifiers of selection and reducers of fixation for death-Birth updating on graphs
• A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
• Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
• Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
• Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics
• The rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities
• More can be better: An analysis of single-mutant fixation probability functions under $2\times 2$ games
• Multiplayer games on regular graphs under aspiration-driven imitation: Fixation probabilities and the dilution principle