paper

Why optional stopping can be a problem for Bayesians

arXiv:1708.08278 · doi:10.3758/s13423-020-01803-x

Abstract

Recently, optional stopping has been a subject of debate in the Bayesian psychology community. Rouder (2014) argues that optional stopping is no problem for Bayesians, and even recommends the use of optional stopping in practice, as do Wagenmakers et al. (2012). This article addresses the question whether optional stopping is problematic for Bayesian methods, and specifies under which circumstances and in which sense it is and is not. By slightly varying and extending Rouder's (2014) experiments, we illustrate that, as soon as the parameters of interest are equipped with default or pragmatic priors - which means, in most practical applications of Bayes factor hypothesis testing - resilience to optional stopping can break down. We distinguish between three types of default priors, each having their own specific issues with optional stopping, ranging from no-problem-at-all (Type 0 priors) to quite severe (Type II priors).

Replacement of Figures 7a-7d in the appendix. There was a mistake in the sampling plan. Thanks to Jorge Tendeiro for pointing this out. Replaced the main text with the final (published) version. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 2020 Advance Publication

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