Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
arXiv:1512.04277
Abstract
Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome. This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.
Extended abstract accepted to SAGT 2016. This ArXiv version corrects typos in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Claims 28-29 of prior ArXiv version