Discussion of "On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle"
arXiv:1411.0810 · doi:10.1214/14-STS474
Abstract
In this discussion we demonstrate that fiducial distributions provide a natural example of an inference paradigm that does not obey Strong Likelihood Principle while still satisfying the Weak Conditionality Principle. [arXiv:1302.7021]
arXiv commentPublished in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/14-STS474 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org)
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