Preventing detector blinding attack and other random number generator attacks on quantum cryptography by use of an explicit random number generator

Abstract

A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original contributions are given to understanding and prevention of this attack.

Improved strategy. 5 pages, 1 figure, 2 equations

References in corpus (4)

• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
• Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
• Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography

Cited by in corpus (2)

• Quantum Random Number Generators
• Physical Security in the Post-quantum Era: A Survey on Side-channel Analysis, Random Number Generators, and Physically Unclonable Functions