Preventing detector blinding attack and other random number generator attacks on quantum cryptography by use of an explicit random number generator
arXiv:1403.0143
Abstract
A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original contributions are given to understanding and prevention of this attack.
arXiv commentImproved strategy. 5 pages, 1 figure, 2 equations
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