Two-way deterministic quantum key distribution against detector side channel attacks

Abstract

In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob then measures the backward qubits to learn about Alice's operations and hence the key bits. Recently, we proved the unconditional security of the final key of this protocol in the ideal device setting. In this paper, we prove that two-way DQKD protocols are immune to all detector side channel attacks at Bob's side, while we assume ideal detectors at Alice's side for error testing. Our result represents a step forward in making DQKD protocols secure against general detector side channel attacks.

Published version

References in corpus (2)

• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• Eavesdropping on the "ping-pong" type quantum communication protocols with invisible photon

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