Two-way deterministic quantum key distribution against detector side channel attacks
arXiv:1312.2644 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.88.044302
Abstract
In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob then measures the backward qubits to learn about Alice's operations and hence the key bits. Recently, we proved the unconditional security of the final key of this protocol in the ideal device setting. In this paper, we prove that two-way DQKD protocols are immune to all detector side channel attacks at Bob's side, while we assume ideal detectors at Alice's side for error testing. Our result represents a step forward in making DQKD protocols secure against general detector side channel attacks.
arXiv commentPublished version
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