About possible extensions of quantum theory

Abstract

Recently it has been claimed that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power, the statement following, according to the authors, from the assumptions of free will and of the correctness of quantum predictions concerning the correlations of measurement outcomes. Here we prove that the argument is basically awed by an inappropriate use of the assumption of free will. In particular, among other implications, the claim, if correct, would imply that Bohmian Mechanics is incompatible with free will. This statement, appearing in the paper, derives from the unjustified identification of free will with the no-signaling constraint and of a purely formal and not physical use of such a constraint.

9 pages, 1 figure; in publication on Found. of Phys

References in corpus (2)

• No extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power
• Onthological models predictively inequivalent to quantum theory

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• Against the No-Go Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics
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• Extending quantum mechanics entails extending special relativity
• Bell's Theorem, Accountability and Nonlocality
• On the Colbeck-Renner Theorem
• Is a description deeper than the quantum one possible?
• Completely real? A critical note on the claims by Colbeck and Renner
• Epistemic Boundaries and Quantum Uncertainty: What Local Observers Can (Not) Predict