A Schelling model with switching agents: decreasing segregation via random allocation and social mobility

Abstract

We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction $f$ of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation (\textit{e.g.} by housing associations) of given, fixed sites in an open residential system, and (ii) superimposition of social and spatial mobility in a closed residential system.\\ We find that the presence of switching agents in a segregative Schelling-type dynamics can lead to the emergence of intermediate patterns (\textit{e.g.} mixture of patches, fuzzy interfaces) as the ones described in Ref. 1. We also investigate different transitions between segregated and mixed phases both at $f=0$ and along lines of increasing $f$, where the nature of the transition changes.

7 pages, 6 figures, to appear in EPJB

References in corpus (6)

• Ising, Schelling and Self-Organising Segregation
• A Biased Review of Sociophysics
• The Peter Principle Revisited: A Computational Study
• Are random trading strategies more successful than technical ones?
• Jamming and pattern formation in models of segregation
• Urban segregation with cheap and expensive residences

Cited by in corpus (4)

• Dynamics of Transformation from Segregation to Mixed Wealth Cities
• Positive algorithmic bias cannot stop fragmentation in homophilic networks
• Cooperative Dynamics of Neighborhood Economic Status in Cities
• Wealth and Identity: The dynamics of dual segregation