Efficient Promotion Strategies in Hierarchical Organizations
arXiv:1102.2837 · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.05.021
Abstract
The Peter principle has been recently investigated by means of an agent-based simulation and its validity has been numerically corroborated. It has been confirmed that, within certain conditions, it can really influence in a negative way the efficiency of a pyramidal organization adopting meritocratic promotions. It was also found that, in order to bypass these effects, alternative promotion strategies should be adopted, as for example a random selection choice. In this paper, within the same line of research, we study promotion strategies in a more realistic hierarchical and modular organization and we show the robustness of our previous results, extending their validity to a more general context. We discuss also why the adoption of these strategies could be useful for real organizations.
27 pages, 12 figures, 2 tables; Improved version with new Fig.4,5,6; Accepted for publication on Physica A
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