A Schelling model with switching agents: decreasing segregation via random allocation and social mobility
arXiv:1212.4929 · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2013-31142-1
Abstract
We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation (\textit{e.g.} by housing associations) of given, fixed sites in an open residential system, and (ii) superimposition of social and spatial mobility in a closed residential system.\\ We find that the presence of switching agents in a segregative Schelling-type dynamics can lead to the emergence of intermediate patterns (\textit{e.g.} mixture of patches, fuzzy interfaces) as the ones described in Ref. 1. We also investigate different transitions between segregated and mixed phases both at and along lines of increasing , where the nature of the transition changes.
arXiv comment7 pages, 6 figures, to appear in EPJB
References in corpus (13)
- Ising, Schelling and Self-Organising Segregation
- Competition between collective and individual dynamics
- Phase diagram of a Schelling segregation model
- A Biased Review of Sociophysics
- The Peter Principle Revisited: A Computational Study
- Are random trading strategies more successful than technical ones?
- Accidental Politicians: How Randomly Selected Legislators Can Improve Parliament Efficiency
- A unified framework for Schelling's model of segregation
- Potts-like model for ghetto formation in multi-cultural societies
- Immigration, integration and ghetto formation
- Efficient Promotion Strategies in Hierarchical Organizations
- Jamming and pattern formation in models of segregation
- Urban segregation with cheap and expensive residences