Evolution of Cooperation on Spatially Embedded Networks
arXiv:1212.2788 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.86.066107
Abstract
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on networks embedded in a Euclidean two-dimensional space with different kinds of degree distributions and topologies going from regular to random, and to scale-free ones. Using several imitative microscopic dynamics, we study the evolution of global cooperation on the above network classes and find that specific topologies having a hierarchical structure and an inhomogeneous degree distribution, such as Apollonian and grid-based networks, are very conducive to cooperation. Spatial scale-free networks are still good for cooperation but to a lesser degree. Both classes of networks enhance average cooperation in all games with respect to standard random geometric graphs and regular grids by shifting the boundaries between cooperative and defective regions. These findings might be useful in the design of interaction structures that maintain cooperation when the agents are constrained to live in physical two-dimensional space.
arXiv commentarXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1201.6257
References in corpus (18)
- Statistical mechanics of complex networks
- Random graphs with arbitrary degree distributions and their applications
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Spatial Networks
- Coevolutionary games - a mini review
- Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics
- Random Geometric Graphs
- Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
- Effects of mobility in a population of Prisoner's Dilemma players
- Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks
- Universality of weak selection
- Scale-free Networks on Lattices
- Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection
- Imitating emotions instead of strategies in spatial games elevates social welfare
- Interrelations between Stochastic Equations for Systems with Pair Interactions
- Naming Games in Two-Dimensional and Small-World-Connected Random Geometric Networks
- Coevolution of strategies and update rules in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks
- Supercooperation in Evolutionary Games on Correlated Weighted Networks
Cited by in corpus (5)
- Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
- Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation
- Opportunistic Migration in Spatial Evolutionary Games
- Oscillatory evolution of collective behavior in evolutionary games played with reinforcement learning
- Truncation selection and diffusion on lattices