Allocation of Divisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences
arXiv:1206.4366 · doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543
Abstract
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.
Cited by in corpus (7)
- Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule
- Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems
- Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms
- Strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods
- Participation Incentives in Randomized Social Choice
- Welfare Maximization and Truthfulness in Mechanism Design with Ordinal Preferences
- Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms Under Various Preferences and Risk Attitudes