activity
20022026
most citedAllocation of Divisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences

25 citations · 78 across the 46 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

57 papers

cs.GT2026

Efficiently Restructuring Sovereign Debt via Arctic Auctions with Convex Costs

Jugal Garg, Edwin Lock, Vijay V. Vazirani

We study the problem of computing competitive equilibria in the Arctic product-mix auction, originally developed for the Icelandic government for exchanging blocked financial accou…

cs.GT2026

Robust Stable Matchings: Dealing with Changes in Preferences

Rohith Reddy Gangam, Tung Mai, Nitya Raju +1

We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances and on the same set…

cs.GT2025

Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs

Vijay V. Vazirani

This paper unifies two foundational constructs from economics and algorithmic game theory, the Arctic Auction and the linear Fisher market, to address the efficient allocation of d…

cs.GT2025

Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints

Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, Vijay V. Vazirani

We study the classical rent division problem, where agents must allocate indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent . The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) alloca…

cs.GT2025

On the Core of the -Matching Game

Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, Vijay V. Vazirani

The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation li…

cs.GT2024

Matching Markets with Chores

Jugal Garg, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani

The fair division of chores, as well as mixed manna (goods and chores), has received substantial recent attention in the fair division literature; however, ours is the first paper…