Fully Distrustful Quantum Cryptography

Abstract

In the distrustful quantum cryptography model the different parties have conflicting interests and do not trust one another. Nevertheless, they trust the quantum devices in their labs. The aim of the device-independent approach to cryptography is to do away with the necessity of making this assumption, and, consequently, significantly increase security. In this paper we enquire whether the scope of the device-independent approach can be extended to the distrustful cryptography model, thereby rendering it `fully' distrustful. We answer this question in the affirmative by presenting a device-independent (imperfect) bit-commitment protocol, which we then use to construct a device-independent coin flipping protocol.

References in corpus (7)

• Device-independent security of quantum cryptography against collective attacks
• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks
• Private Randomness Expansion With Untrusted Devices
• Implications of Superstrong Nonlocality for Cryptography
• Experimental quantum tossing of a single coin
• Tight bounds for classical and quantum coin flipping

Cited by in corpus (5)

• Device-Independent Randomness Generation in the Presence of Weak Cross-Talk
• Closing the detection loophole in multipartite Bell tests using GHZ states
• Quantum non-locality, causality and mistrustful cryptography
• Secure positioning and non-local correlations
• Quantum bit commitment with cheat sensitive binding and approximate sealing