Dynamics of Strategic Three-Choice Voting

Abstract

In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideologically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties that frequently exchange majority status and a third party that is almost always in the minority.

6 pages, 4 figures. Version 2: reference added. Version 3: final version

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• Solution of the multi-state voter model and application to strong neutrals in the naming game
• A stochastic analysis of the spatially extended May-Leonard model
• The Effect of Exogenous Inputs and Defiant Agents on Opinion Dynamics with Local and Global Interactions
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• A middle option for choices in the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions model
• Bi-layer voter model: Modeling intolerant/tolerant positions and bots in opinion dynamics
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