On the optimality of individual entangling-probe attacks against BB84 quantum key distribution
arXiv:0711.1728 · doi:10.1140/epjd/e2008-00002-x
Abstract
It is shown that an existing method to study ideal individual attacks on the BB84 QKD protocol using error discard can be adapted to reconciliation with error correction, and that an optimal attack can be explicitly found. Moreover, this attack fills Luetkenhaus bound, independently of whether error positions are leaked to Eve, proving that it is tight. In addition, we clarify why the existence of such optimal attacks is not in contradiction with the established ``old-style'' theory of BB84 individual attacks, as incorrectly suggested recently in a news feature.
12 pages, 3 figures
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