Constructing quantum games from non-factorizable joint probabilities
arXiv:0707.2868 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.76.061122
Abstract
A probabilistic framework is developed that gives a unifying perspective on both the classical and the quantum games. We suggest exploiting peculiar probabilities involved in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments to construct quantum games. In our framework a game attains classical interpretation when joint probabilities are factorizable and a quantum game corresponds when these probabilities cannot be factorized. We analyze how non-factorizability changes Nash equilibria in two-player games while considering the games of Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. In this framework we find that for the game of Prisoner's Dilemma even non-factorizable EPR joint probabilities cannot be helpful to escape from the classical outcome of the game. For a particular version of the Chicken game, however, we find that the two non-factorizable sets of joint probabilities, that maximally violates the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations, indeed result in new Nash equilibria.
Revised in light of referee's comments, submitted to Physical Review E
References in corpus (1)
Cited by in corpus (5)
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- Equivalence between Bell inequalities and quantum Minority game