599 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- National and Kapodistrian University of AthensGR24 papers
- National Technical University of AthensGR11 papers
- Athena Research and Innovation Center In Information Communication & Knowledge TechnologiesGR9 papers
- Athens State UniversityUS7 papers
- Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueFR7 papers
- Centrum Wiskunde & InformaticaNL7 papers
- Delft University of TechnologyNL7 papers
- École PolytechniqueFR7 papers
- University College LondonGB7 papers
- University of OxfordGB7 papers
- Laboratoire d'Informatique de l'École PolytechniqueFR6 papers
- University of AmsterdamNL6 papers
21 papers · 1 filter
On the Tractability Landscape of the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule
Georgios Amanatidis, Michael Lampis, Evangelos Markakis +1
This work examines the Conditional Approval Framework for elections involving multiple interdependent issues, specifically focusing on the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule.…
Pandora's Box Problem With Time Constraints
Georgios Amanatidis, Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra +4
The Pandora's Box problem models the search for the best alternative when evaluation is costly. In the simplest variant, a decision maker is presented with boxes, each associat…
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis +2
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interest…
Closed Non-atomic Resource Allocation Games
Costas Courcoubetis, Antonis Dimakis
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a co…
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond
Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mech…
Multiple Birds with One Stone: Beating for EFX and GMMS via Envy Cycle Elimination
Georgios Amanatidis, Apostolos Ntokos, Evangelos Markakis
Several relaxations of envy-freeness, tailored to fair division in settings with indivisible goods, have been introduced within the last decade. Due to the lack of general existenc…
Measuring Market Performance with Stochastic Demand: Price of Anarchy and Price of Uncertainty
Costis Melolidakis, Stefanos Leonardos, Constandina Koki
Globally operating suppliers face the rising challenge of wholesale pricing under scarce data about retail demand, in contrast to better informed, locally operating retailers. At t…
Comparative Statics via Stochastic Orderings in a Two-Echelon Market with Upstream Demand Uncertainty
Constandina Koki, Stefanos Leonardos, Costis Melolidakis
We revisit the classic Cournot model and extend it to a two-echelon supply chain with an upstream supplier who operates under demand uncertainty and multiple downstream retailers w…
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, George Christodoulou +1
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains…
On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer w…
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a…
On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of players, the maximin share of a single player is th…
Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties
Katarína Cechlárová, Pavlos Eirinakis, Tamás Fleiner +5
We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses an…
Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Afshin Nikzad +1
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent…
Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-biased Voters
Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova +1
We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary preferences, which govern th…
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions: Charting the Tractability Frontier
Yair Zick, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind +1
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be div…
On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets
Josep Diaz, Ioannis Giotis, Lefteris Kirousis +2
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motiva…
Paradoxes in Social Networks with Multiple Products
Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis, Sunil Simon
Recently, we introduced in arXiv:1105.2434 a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one o…
On the Inefficiency of the Uniform Price Auction
Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand b…
Undominated Groves Mechanisms
Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt +1
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortuna…
Optimal Strategies in Sequential Bidding
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vangelis Markakis
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, a…