192 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Fudan UniversityCN23 papers
- Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityCN16 papers
- Peking UniversityCN14 papers
- Chinese University of Hong KongHK11 papers
- Tsinghua UniversityCN10 papers
- University of MinnesotaUS9 papers
- Nanyang Technological UniversitySG8 papers
- Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHK7 papers
- University of Hong KongHK7 papers
- University of WashingtonUS7 papers
- Stanford UniversityUS6 papers
- University of Minnesota SystemUS6 papers
4 papers · 2 filters
Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi +2
We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, i…
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala +1
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with heterogeneou…
Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang +1
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessari…
An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a -fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' value…