output
20042026
most citedResearch Commentary on Recommendations with Side Information: A Survey and Research Directions

192 citations

Showing cs.GTShow all

16 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

PPA-Game: Characterizing and Learning Competitive Dynamics Among Online Content Creators

Renzhe Xu, Haotian Wang, Xingxuan Zhang +2

In this paper, we present the Proportional Payoff Allocation Game (PPA-Game), which characterizes situations where agents compete for divisible resources. In the PPA-game, agents s…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Bidder Selection Problem in Position Auctions: A Fast and Simple Algorithm via Poisson Approximation

Nickolai Gravin, Yixuan Even Xu, Renfei Zhou

In the Bidder Selection Problem (BSP) there is a large pool of potential advertisers competing for ad slots on the user's web page. Due to strict computational restrictions, th…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Lookahead Auctions with Pooling

Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1

A Lookahead Auction (LA), introduced by Ronen, is an auction format for the sale of a single item among multiple buyers, which is considered simpler and more fair than the optimal…

cs.GT2022

Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations

Xiaoming Gong

This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals…

cs.GT2021

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms

Yaonan Jin, Shunhua Jiang, Pinyan Lu +1

This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the -unit setting, where a monopolist seller has copies of an indivisible item and faces unit-demand buyers (whose…

cs.GT2020

Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule

Zihe Wang, Zhide Wei, Jie Zhang

The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is well-known for its desirable fairness and efficiency properties. It is one of the most prominent protocols for the random assignment problem.…

cs.GT2019

A Game-theoretical Approach to Analyze Film Release Time

Hua Liu, Mengjing Chen, Xiaolong Wang +1

Film release dates play an important part in box office revenues because of the facts of obvious seasonality demand in the film industry and severe competition among films shown at…

cs.GT2019★ 3 cited

Optimal mechanisms with budget for user generated contents

Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang +2

In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the p…

cs.GT2019

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions

Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo

First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with di…

cs.GT2019★ 25 cited

An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores

Xin Huang, Pinyan Lu

In this paper, we consider the problem of how to fairly dividing indivisible chores among agents. The fairness measure we considered here is the maximin share. The previous…

cs.GT2019★ 31 cited

Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items

Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Xin Huang

Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to an…

cs.GT2019★ 4 cited

Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations

Nick Gravin, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu +1

In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio…

cs.GT2018★ 2 cited

Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing

Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi +2

We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, i…

cs.GT2018

A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer

Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala +1

We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with heterogeneou…

cs.GT2018★ 14 cited

Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms

Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang +1

We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessari…

cs.GT2018

An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions

Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang

This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a -fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' value…