192 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Fudan UniversityCN23 papers
- Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityCN16 papers
- Peking UniversityCN14 papers
- Chinese University of Hong KongHK11 papers
- Tsinghua UniversityCN10 papers
- University of MinnesotaUS9 papers
- Nanyang Technological UniversitySG8 papers
- Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHK7 papers
- University of Hong KongHK7 papers
- University of WashingtonUS7 papers
- Stanford UniversityUS6 papers
- University of Minnesota SystemUS6 papers
16 papers · 1 filter
PPA-Game: Characterizing and Learning Competitive Dynamics Among Online Content Creators
Renzhe Xu, Haotian Wang, Xingxuan Zhang +2
In this paper, we present the Proportional Payoff Allocation Game (PPA-Game), which characterizes situations where agents compete for divisible resources. In the PPA-game, agents s…
Bidder Selection Problem in Position Auctions: A Fast and Simple Algorithm via Poisson Approximation
Nickolai Gravin, Yixuan Even Xu, Renfei Zhou
In the Bidder Selection Problem (BSP) there is a large pool of potential advertisers competing for ad slots on the user's web page. Due to strict computational restrictions, th…
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling
Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1
A Lookahead Auction (LA), introduced by Ronen, is an auction format for the sale of a single item among multiple buyers, which is considered simpler and more fair than the optimal…
Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations
Xiaoming Gong
This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals…
Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms
Yaonan Jin, Shunhua Jiang, Pinyan Lu +1
This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the -unit setting, where a monopolist seller has copies of an indivisible item and faces unit-demand buyers (whose…
Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule
Zihe Wang, Zhide Wei, Jie Zhang
The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is well-known for its desirable fairness and efficiency properties. It is one of the most prominent protocols for the random assignment problem.…
A Game-theoretical Approach to Analyze Film Release Time
Hua Liu, Mengjing Chen, Xiaolong Wang +1
Film release dates play an important part in box office revenues because of the facts of obvious seasonality demand in the film industry and severe competition among films shown at…
Optimal mechanisms with budget for user generated contents
Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang +2
In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the p…
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo
First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with di…
An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores
Xin Huang, Pinyan Lu
In this paper, we consider the problem of how to fairly dividing indivisible chores among agents. The fairness measure we considered here is the maximin share. The previous…
Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items
Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Xin Huang
Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to an…
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations
Nick Gravin, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu +1
In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio…
Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi +2
We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, i…
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala +1
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with heterogeneou…
Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang +1
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessari…
An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a -fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' value…