758 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Microsoft (United States)US53 papers
- Cornell UniversityUS15 papers
- Carnegie Mellon UniversityUS9 papers
- University of Massachusetts AmherstUS8 papers
- Princeton UniversityUS7 papers
- Columbia UniversityUS6 papers
- Microsoft Research (United Kingdom)GB6 papers
- University of PennsylvaniaUS6 papers
- University of Maryland, College ParkUS5 papers
- University of MichiganUS5 papers
- Harvard UniversityUS4 papers
- Stanford UniversityUS4 papers
14 papers · 1 filter
Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Chores
Rupert Freeman, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish +1
We study fair allocation of indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive value) among agents with additive valuations. An allocation is deemed fair if it is (approximately) eq…
Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals
Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters +1
We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible al…
The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach
Guy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins +1
We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal d…
Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem
Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri +1
In the classical secretary problem, one attempts to find the maximum of an unknown and unlearnable distribution through sequential search. In many real-world searches, however, dis…
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games
Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi +1
An ever-important issue is protecting infrastructure and other valuable targets from a range of threats from vandalism to theft to piracy to terrorism. The "defender" can rarely af…
On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers
Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid f…
Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer Programming
Christian Kroer, Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie +1
We present a new combinatorial market maker that operates arbitrage-free combinatorial prediction markets specified by integer programs. Although the problem of arbitrage-free pric…
Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games
Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis +1
We consider a ubiquitous scenario in the Internet economy when individual decision-makers (henceforth, agents) both produce and consume information as they make strategic choices i…
Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Jacob Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie, Matus Telgarsky
We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide…
No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games
Jason Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics,…
Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Alekh Agarwal, Haipeng Luo +1
We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equi…
Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibr…
Incentivizing High Quality Crowdwork
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Siddharth Suri +1
We study the causal effects of financial incentives on the quality of crowdwork. We focus on performance-based payments (PBPs), bonus payments awarded to workers for producing high…
Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating…