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20032010
most citedPunish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game

420 citations

Showing 2010Show all

9 papers · 1 filter

cs.NI2010107 cited

Connectivity statistics of store-and-forward inter-vehicle communication

Arne Kesting, Martin Treiber, Dirk Helbing

Inter-vehicle communication (IVC) enables vehicles to exchange messages within a limited broadcast range and thus self-organize into dynamical vehicular ad hoc networks. For the fo…

physics.soc-ph201012 cited

An Agent-Based Approach to Self-Organized Production

Thomas Seidel, Jeanette Hartwig, Richard L. Sanders +1

The chapter describes the modeling of a material handling system with the production of individual units in a scheduled order. The units represent the agents in the model and are t…

physics.soc-ph201041 cited

BioLogistics and the Struggle for Efficiency: Concepts and Perspectives

Dirk Helbing, Andreas Deutsch, Stefan Diez +8

The growth of world population, limitation of resources, economic problems and environmental issues force engineers to develop increasingly efficient solutions for logistic systems…

physics.soc-ph201065 cited

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Dirk Helbing, Anders Johansson

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is li…

math.PR201017 cited

Strong approximation of fractional Brownian motion by moving averages of simple random walks

Tamas Szabados

The fractional Brownian motion is a generalization of ordinary Brownian motion, used particularly when long-range dependence is required. Its explicit introduction is due to B.B. M…

physics.soc-ph2010420 cited

Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game

Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc +1

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators…