47 citations · 86 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
BRIGHTNESS: Leaking Sensitive Data from Air-Gapped Workstations via Screen Brightness
Mordechai Guri, Dima Bykhovsky, Yuval Elovici
Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel i…
CTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Keyboard LEDs
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a m…
PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers through Power Lines
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1
In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers.…
aIR-Jumper: Covert Air-Gap Exfiltration/Infiltration via Security Cameras & Infrared (IR)
Mordechai Guri, Dima Bykhovsky, Yuval Elovici
Infrared (IR) light is invisible to humans, but cameras are optically sensitive to this type of light. In this paper, we show how attackers can use surveillance cameras and infrare…