10 citations · 24 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Pipe-Cleaner: Flexible Fuzzing Using Security Policies
Allison Naaktgeboren, Sean Noble Anderson, Andrew Tolmach +1
Fuzzing has proven to be very effective for discovering certain classes of software flaws, but less effective in helping developers process these discoveries. Conventional crash-ba…
SECOMP: Formally Secure Compilation of Compartmentalized C Programs
Jérémy Thibault, Roberto Blanco, Dongjae Lee +5
Undefined behavior in C often causes devastating security vulnerabilities. One practical mitigation is compartmentalization, which allows developers to structure large programs int…
Formalizing Stack Safety as a Security Property
Sean Noble Anderson, Roberto Blanco, Leonidas Lampropoulos +2
The term stack safety is used to describe a variety of compiler, run-time, and hardware mechanisms for protecting stack memory. Unlike "the heap," the ISA-level stack does not corr…
Towards Formally Verified Compilation of Tag-Based Policy Enforcement
CHR Chhak, Andrew Tolmach, Sean Anderson
Hardware-assisted reference monitoring is receiving increasing attention as a way to improve the security of existing software. One example is the PIPE architecture extension, whic…
When Good Components Go Bad: Formally Secure Compilation Despite Dynamic Compromise
Carmine Abate, Arthur Azevedo de Amorim, Roberto Blanco +8
We propose a new formal criterion for evaluating secure compilation schemes for unsafe languages, expressing end-to-end security guarantees for software components that may become…
Formally Secure Compilation of Unsafe Low-Level Components (Extended Abstract)
Guglielmo Fachini, Catalin Hritcu, Marco Stronati +5
We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior…
Towards a Fully Abstract Compiler Using Micro-Policies: Secure Compilation for Mutually Distrustful Components
Yannis Juglaret, Catalin Hritcu, Arthur Azevedo de Amorim +3
Secure compilation prevents all low-level attacks on compiled code and allows for sound reasoning about security in the source language. In this work we propose a new attacker mode…
A Verified Information-Flow Architecture
Arthur Azevedo de Amorim, Nathan Collins, André DeHon +6
SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supp…