126 citations · 284 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
DRAWNAPART: A Device Identification Technique based on Remote GPU Fingerprinting
Tomer Laor, Naif Mehanna, Antonin Durey +7
Browser fingerprinting aims to identify users or their devices, through scripts that execute in the users' browser and collect information on software or hardware characteristics.…
Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests
Moritz Lipp, Misiker Tadesse Aga, Michael Schwarz +4
A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate modification. Classical fault attacks show that this ass…
Automated Detection, Exploitation, and Elimination of Double-Fetch Bugs using Modern CPU Features
Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp +4
Double-fetch bugs are a special type of race condition, where an unprivileged execution thread is able to change a memory location between the time-of-check and time-of-use of a pr…
KeyDrown: Eliminating Keystroke Timing Side-Channel Attacks
Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss +4
Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke ti…
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss +2
In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hyperviso…
DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
Peter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice +2
In cloud computing environments, multiple tenants are often co-located on the same multi-processor system. Thus, preventing information leakage between tenants is crucial. While th…
ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices
Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer +2
In the last 10 years, cache attacks on Intel x86 CPUs have gained increasing attention among the scientific community and powerful techniques to exploit cache side channels have be…
Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack
Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Klaus Wagner +1
Research on cache attacks has shown that CPU caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all cache attacks cause more cache hits and cache misses…
Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript
Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Stefan Mangard
A fundamental assumption in software security is that a memory location can only be modified by processes that may write to this memory location. However, a recent study has shown…