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researcher

G. Monaco

9 papers hereh-index 19969 citations68 works total

Matching runs newest-first, so older work may not be attached to this profile yet.

author position
  • first author1
  • middle author5
  • last author3

Across the 9 of 9 papers where every author was matched, so the position is known.

fields
  • cs.GT7
  • cs.AI1
  • cs.DS1
same name
  • G. Monaco — 40 papers, h 44
  • G. Monaco — 9 papers, h 11
  • G. Monaco — 6 papers, h 17
  • G. Monaco — 5 papers, h 9
  • G. Monaco — 4 papers, h 3
  • G. Monaco — 2 papers, h 6

Either other researchers who publish under this name, or the same person where the external sources have not merged their records.

identity via Semantic Scholar / OpenAlex

activity
20132020
most citedAlmost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles

38 citations · 46 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2018Show all

4 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2018

Coalition Resilient Outcomes in Max k-Cut Games

Raffaello Carosi, Simone Fioravanti, Luciano Gualà +1

We investigate strong Nash equilibria in the \emph{max k-cut game}, where we are given an undirected edge-weighted graph together with a set {1,…,k} of k colors. Node…

cs.DS2018

Generalized budgeted submodular set function maximization

Francesco Cellinese, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Gianpiero Monaco +1

In this paper we consider a generalization of the well-known budgeted maximum coverage problem. We are given a ground set of elements and a set of bins. The goal is to find a subse…

cs.GT2018★ 38 cited

Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles

Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini +5

We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an und…

cs.GT2018

Stable Outcomes in Modified Fractional Hedonic Games

Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Yllka Velaj

In coalition formation games self-organized coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent agents. For each couple of agents (i,j), weight $w_{i,…

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Not affiliated with arXiv. Researcher data from Semantic Scholar (ODC-BY) and OpenAlex.