activity
20172023
most citedUNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent Threats

308 citations · 529 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

cs.CR2023★ 5 cited

Kairos: Practical Intrusion Detection and Investigation using Whole-system Provenance

Zijun Cheng, Qiujian Lv, Jinyuan Liang +4

Provenance graphs are structured audit logs that describe the history of a system's execution. Recent studies have explored a variety of techniques to analyze provenance graphs for…

cs.OS2023

Unleashing Unprivileged eBPF Potential with Dynamic Sandboxing

Soo Yee Lim, Xueyuan Han, Thomas Pasquier

For safety reasons, unprivileged users today have only limited ways to customize the kernel through the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF). This is unfortunate, especially sinc…

cs.CR2021

Secure Namespaced Kernel Audit for Containers

Soo Yee Lim, Bogdan Stelea, Xueyuan Han +1

Despite the wide usage of container-based cloud computing, container auditing for security analysis relies mostly on built-in host audit systems, which often lack the ability to ca…

cs.CR2020★ 18 cited

SIGL: Securing Software Installations Through Deep Graph Learning

Xueyuan Han, Xiao Yu, Thomas Pasquier +5

Many users implicitly assume that software can only be exploited after it is installed. However, recent supply-chain attacks demonstrate that application integrity must be ensured…

cs.CR2020★ 4 cited

Xanthus: Push-button Orchestration of Host Provenance Data Collection

Xueyuan Han, James Mickens, Ashish Gehani +2

Host-based anomaly detectors generate alarms by inspecting audit logs for suspicious behavior. Unfortunately, evaluating these anomaly detectors is hard. There are few high-quality…

cs.CR2020★ 308 cited

UNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent Threats

Xueyuan Han, Thomas Pasquier, Adam Bates +2

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difficult to detect due to their "low-and-slow" attack patterns and frequent use of zero-day exploits. We present UNICORN, an anomaly-based A…

cs.CR2018★ 3 cited

Runtime Analysis of Whole-System Provenance

Thomas Pasquier, Xueyuan Han, Thomas Moyer +5

Identifying the root cause and impact of a system intrusion remains a foundational challenge in computer security. Digital provenance provides a detailed history of the flow of inf…

cs.CR2018★ 8 cited

Provenance-based Intrusion Detection: Opportunities and Challenges

Xueyuan Han, Thomas Pasquier, Margo Seltzer

Intrusion detection is an arms race; attackers evade intrusion detection systems by developing new attack vectors to sidestep known defense mechanisms. Provenance provides a detail…

cs.DL2018★ 1 cited

Sharing and Preserving Computational Analyses for Posterity with encapsulator

Thomas Pasquier, Matthew K. Lau, Xueyuan Han +6

Open data and open-source software may be part of the solution to science's "reproducibility crisis", but they are insufficient to guarantee reproducibility. Requiring minimal end-…

eess.SY2017★ 26 cited

FRAPpuccino: Fault-detection through Runtime Analysis of Provenance

Xueyuan Han, Thomas Pasquier, Tanvi Ranjan +2

We present FRAPpuccino (or FRAP), a provenance-based fault detection mechanism for Platform as a Service (PaaS) users, who run many instances of an application on a large cluster o…

cs.CR2017★ 156 cited

Practical Whole-System Provenance Capture

Thomas Pasquier, Xueyuan Han, Mark Goldstein +4

Data provenance describes how data came to be in its present form. It includes data sources and the transformations that have been applied to them. Data provenance has many uses, f…