20 citations · 38 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria
Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer +2
A recent emerging trend in the literature on learning in games has been concerned with providing faster learning dynamics for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in normal-…
The Parity Ray Regularizer for Pacing in Auction Markets
Andrea Celli, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Christian Kroer +1
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at wh…
Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Andrea Celli +1
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringen…
Simple Uncoupled No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium
Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi +1
The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent system…
Faster Algorithms for Optimal Ex-Ante Coordinated Collusive Strategies in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games
Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti +1
We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are n…
Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-recei…