7 citations · 18 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Axiomatic Choice
Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei
People care about decision outcomes and how decisions get made, both when making decisions and reflecting on decisions. But formalizing the full range of normative concerns that dr…
DeepVoting: Learning and Fine-Tuning Voting Rules with Canonical Embeddings
Leonardo Matone, Ben Abramowitz, Ben Armstrong +2
Aggregating agent preferences into a collective decision is an important step in many problems (e.g., hiring, elections, peer review) and across areas of computer science (e.g., re…
Pandering in a Flexible Representative Democracy
Xiaolin Sun, Jacob Masur, Ben Abramowitz +2
In representative democracies, the election of new representatives in regular election cycles is meant to prevent corruption and other misbehavior by elected officials and to keep…
Social Mechanism Design: Making Maximally Acceptable Decisions
Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei
Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a…
Who Reviews The Reviewers? A Multi-Level Jury Problem
Ben Abramowitz, Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei
We consider the problem of determining a binary ground truth using advice from a group of independent reviewers (experts) who express their guess about a ground truth correctly wit…
Towards Group Learning: Distributed Weighting of Experts
Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei
Aggregating signals from a collection of noisy sources is a fundamental problem in many domains including crowd-sourcing, multi-agent planning, sensor networks, signal processing,…
Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice
Ben Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi +2
Any community in which membership is optional may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, cryptocu…
In the Beginning there were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution
Ben Abramowitz, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
Consider n agents forming an egalitarian, self-governed community. Their first task is to decide on a decision rule to make further decisions. We start from a rather general initia…
Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice
Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu
We develop new voting mechanisms for the case when voters and candidates are located in an arbitrary unknown metric space, and the goal is to choose a candidate minimizing social c…
Flexible Representative Democracy: An Introduction with Binary Issues
Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei
We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy (RD) and Direct Democracy (DD) in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weight…
Utilitarians Without Utilities: Maximizing Social Welfare for Graph Problems using only Ordinal Preferences - Full Version
Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich
We consider ordinal approximation algorithms for a broad class of utility maximization problems for multi-agent systems. In these problems, agents have utilities for connecting to…