16 citations · 24 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Popularity in location games
Gaëtan Fournier, Marc Schröder
We study a variant of the Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition between firms where consumer choices are influenced by their individual preferences as well as the popularity…
Strategic flip-flopping in political competition
Gaëtan Fournier, Alberto Grillo, Yevgeny Tsodikovich
We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the media…
Location games with references
Fournier Gaëtan, Francou Amaury
We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of gam…
Spatial competition with unit-demand functions
Gaëtan Fournier, Karine Van Der Straeten, Jörgen Weibull
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the re…
Approachability with Constraints
Gaëtan Fournier, Eden Kuperwasser, Orin Munk +2
We study approachability theory in the presence of constraints. Given a repeated game with vector payoffs, we characterize the pairs of sets (A,D) in the payoff space such that Pla…
Price dynamics on a risk-averse market with asymmetric information
Bernard De Meyer, Gaëtan Fournier
A market with asymmetric information can be viewed as a repeated exchange game between the informed sector and the uninformed one. In a market with risk-neutral agents, De Meyer [2…
General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
Gaëtan Fournier
A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we…
Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
Gaëtan Fournier, Marco Scarsini
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but on…