32 citations · 121 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers · 1 filter
Who Is Really Playing? Strategic Interaction in AI-Guided Populations
Jonathan Shaki, Eden Hartman, Sarit Kraus +1
AI systems in general, and Large language models (LLMs), in particular, are increasingly used to provide instructions to many agents who interact with one another. Such shared reli…
Coalition Tactics: Bribery and Control in Parliamentary Elections
Hodaya Barr, Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann +1
Strategic manipulation of elections is typically studied in the context of promoting individual candidates. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters may care m…
Facilitating Matches on Allocation Platforms
Yohai Trabelsi, Abhijin Adiga, Yonatan Aumann +2
We consider a setting where goods are allocated to agents by way of an allocation platform (e.g., a matching platform). An ``allocation facilitator'' aims to increase the overall u…
Bribery for Coalitions in Parliamentary Elections
Hodaya Barr, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus
We study the computational complexity of bribery in parliamentary voting, in settings where the briber is (also) interested in the success of an entire set of political parties - a…
Control for Coalitions in Parliamentary Elections
Hodaya Barr, Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann +1
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less abo…
Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms
Jonathan Shaki, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus
Issue salience is a major determinant in voters' decisions. Candidates and political parties campaign to shift salience to their advantage - a process termed priming. We study the…
Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization
Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim +1
Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest…
Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective
Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann +1
Leximin is a common approach to multi-objective optimization, frequently employed in fair division applications. In leximin optimization, one first aims to maximize the smallest ob…
Robust Solutions for Multi-Defender Stackelberg Security Games
Dolev Mutzari, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus
Multi-defender Stackelberg Security Games (MSSG) have recently gained increasing attention in the literature. However, the solutions offered to date are highly sensitive, wherein e…
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuatio…
Envy-Free Division of Land
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim +1
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair accordin…
SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented the first dominant strategy truthful mechanism for double auction. His mechanism attains nearly optimal gain-from-trade when the market…
Demand-Flow of Agents with Gross-Substitute Valuations
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
We consider the class of valuations on indivisible items called gross-substitute (GS). This class was introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and is widely used in studies of marke…
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are…
Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim +1
We consider the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents with different valuations. Classic cake-cutting procedures either allocate eac…
Fair and Square: Cake-cutting in Two Dimensions
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two dimensional heterogeneous good among multiple players. Applications include division of land as well as ad space in print and elect…
Computing Socially-Efficient Cake Divisions
Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim
We consider a setting in which a single divisible good ("cake") needs to be divided between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake. Fo…
Throw One's Cake --- and Have It Too
Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous cake between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may resul…