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20242026
most citedThe Sample Complexity of Uniform Approximation for Multi-Dimensional CDFs and Fixed-Price Mechanisms

1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.LG2026

Breaking the Barrier for Regret Minimization With Bi-Dimensional CDFs

Matteo Castiglioni, Anna Lunghi, Alberto Marchesi

We study regret minimization for learning CDF-related objectives of the form \[ g(x)\cdot\mathbb{P}_{X\sim\mathcal{D}}(X\le x), \] over , where is a known Lipschitz fu…

cs.GT2026

Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets

Anna Lunghi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in…

cs.LG20261 cited

The Sample Complexity of Uniform Approximation for Multi-Dimensional CDFs and Fixed-Price Mechanisms

Matteo Castiglioni, Anna Lunghi, Alberto Marchesi

We study the sample complexity of learning a uniform approximation of an -dimensional cumulative distribution function (CDF) within an error , when observations are restr…

cs.GT2026

A Stronger Benchmark for Online Bilateral Trade: From Fixed Prices to Distributions

Anna Lunghi, Mattia Piccinato, Matteo Castiglioni +1

We study online bilateral trade, where a learner facilitates repeated exchanges between a buyer and a seller to maximize the Gain From Trade (GFT), i.e., the social welfare. In doi…

cs.GT2025

Better Regret Rates in Bilateral Trade via Sublinear Budget Violation

Anna Lunghi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi

Bilateral trade is a central problem in algorithmic economics, and recent work has explored how to design trading mechanisms using no-regret learning algorithms. However, no-regret…

cs.GT2025

Online Two-Sided Markets: Many Buyers Enhance Learning

Anna Lunghi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi

We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade s…