4 papers
Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms
Rafael Gomes, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer +1
We study the strategic facility location problem under the egalitarian objective, where a mechanism uses the reported locations of a set of agents in Euclidean space to select a fa…
Beyond Stability: Improved Efficiency Guarantees for -Stable Matchings
Isabel Fernandez Abad, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer
Stable matching mechanisms are fundamental to market design but face an inherent tension between stability and social welfare optimality. We study a natural relaxation of stability…
Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll +3
Online advertising systems have recently transitioned to autobidding, allowing advertisers to delegate bidding decisions to automated agents. Each advertiser directs their agent to…
The Effectiveness of Golden Tickets and Wooden Spoons for Budget-Feasible Mechanisms
Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis +1
One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these…