50 citations · 157 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Fallout: Reading Kernel Writes From User Space
Marina Minkin, Daniel Moghimi, Moritz Lipp +7
Recently, out-of-order execution, an important performance optimization in modern high-end processors, has been revealed to pose a significant security threat, allowing information…
ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution
Michael Schwarz, Robert Schilling, Florian Kargl +3
Out-of-order execution and speculative execution are among the biggest contributors to performance and efficiency of modern processors. However, they are inconsiderate, leaking sec…
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi +4
In early 2018, Meltdown first showed how to read arbitrary kernel memory from user space by exploiting side-effects from transient instructions. While this attack has been mitigate…
Store-to-Leak Forwarding: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs (Updated and Extended Version)
Michael Schwarz, Claudio Canella, Lukas Giner +1
Meltdown and Spectre exploit microarchitectural changes the CPU makes during transient out-of-order execution. Using side-channel techniques, these attacks enable leaking arbitrary…
Practical Enclave Malware with Intel SGX
Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss
Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted encla…
Page Cache Attacks
Daniel Gruss, Erik Kraft, Trishita Tiwari +5
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The pag…