66 citations · 133 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi +4
In early 2018, Meltdown first showed how to read arbitrary kernel memory from user space by exploiting side-effects from transient instructions. While this attack has been mitigate…
LazyFP: Leaking FPU Register State using Microarchitectural Side-Channels
Julian Stecklina, Thomas Prescher
Modern processors utilize an increasingly large register set to facilitate efficient floating point and SIMD computation. This large register set is a burden for operating systems,…
Meltdown
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss +7
The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access. In this pape…
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss +7
Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the proc…