10 citations · 23 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static item pricing, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase…
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to o…
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers…
Posted Pricing sans Discrimination
Shreyas Sekar
In the quest for market mechanisms that are easy to implement, yet close to optimal, few seem as viable as posted pricing. Despite the growing body of impressive results, the perfo…
Submodular Maximization using Test Scores
Shreyas Sekar, Milan Vojnovic, Se-Young Yun
We study the canonical problem of maximizing a stochastic submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint, where the goal is to select a subset from a ground set of items w…