10 citations · 23 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers · 1 filter
What is Best for Students, Numerical Scores or Letter Grades?
Evi Micha, Shreyas Sekar, Nisarg Shah
We study letter grading schemes, which are routinely employed for evaluating student performance. Typically, a numerical score obtained via one or more evaluations is converted int…
Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing Networks: When does it help?
Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff +1
We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a…
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static item pricing, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase…
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to o…
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers…
Posted Pricing sans Discrimination
Shreyas Sekar
In the quest for market mechanisms that are easy to implement, yet close to optimal, few seem as viable as posted pricing. Despite the growing body of impressive results, the perfo…
Blind, Greedy, and Random: Ordinal Approximation Algorithms for Matching and Clustering
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has ac…
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the valu…
Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Des…
Price Competition in Networked Markets: How do monopolies impact social welfare?
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. Wh…
Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consid…