activity
20182025
most citedTowards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

16 citations · 18 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

18 papers

cs.GT2025

Market Clearing with Semi-fungible Assets

Theo Diamandis, Tarun Chitra, Guillermo Angeris

As markets have digitized, the number of tradable products has skyrocketed. Algorithmically constructed portfolios of these assets now dominate public and private markets, resultin…

cs.GT2025

Perpetual Demand Lending Pools

Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis, Nathan Sheng +2

Decentralized perpetuals protocols have collectively reached billions of dollars of daily trading volume, yet are still not serious competitors on the basis of trading volume with…

math.OC2024

The Convex Geometry of Network Flows

Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris

In this paper, we derive a number of interesting properties and extensions of the convex flow problem from the perspective of convex geometry. We show that the sets of allowable fl…

math.OC2024

Solving the Convex Flow Problem

Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris

In this paper, we introduce the solver ConvexFlows for the convex flow problem first defined in the authors' previous work. In this problem, we aim to optimize a concave utility fu…

math.OC2024

Convex Network Flows

Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris, Alan Edelman

We introduce a general framework for flow problems over hypergraphs. In our problem formulation, which we call the convex flow problem, we have a concave utility function for the n…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

An Analysis of Intent-Based Markets

Tarun Chitra, Kshitij Kulkarni, Mallesh Pai +1

Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to t…

cs.GT2024

Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal

Guillermo Angeris, Theo Diamandis, Ciamac Moallemi

In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case adversaries. I…

math.OC2023

GeNIOS: an (almost) second-order operator-splitting solver for large-scale convex optimization

Theo Diamandis, Zachary Frangella, Shipu Zhao +2

We introduce the GEneralized Newton Inexact Operator Splitting solver (GeNIOS) for large-scale convex optimization. GeNIOS speeds up ADMM by approximately solving approximate subpr…

math.OC2023

The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers

Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +2

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are the most popular type of decentralized trading venue for cryptocurrency tokens. In this paper, we give a very general geometric framewor…

math.OC2023

A Note on the Welfare Gap in Fair Ordering

Theo Diamandis, Guillermo Angeris

Public blockchains group submitted transactions into batches, called blocks. A natural question is how to determine which transactions are included in these batches. In this note,…

math.OC2023

An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers

Theo Diamandis, Max Resnick, Tarun Chitra +1

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) such as Uniswap have facilitated trillions of dollars of digital asset trades and have billions of dollars of liquidity. One natural questio…

cs.GT2023

Concave Pro-rata Games

Nicholas A. G Johnson, Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans +2

In this paper, we introduce a family of games called concave pro-rata games. In such a game, players place their assets into a pool, and the pool pays out some concave function of…

math.OC2023★ 1 cited

On the (linear) convergence of Generalized Newton Inexact ADMM

Zachary Frangella, Theo Diamandis, Bartolomeo Stellato +1

This paper presents GeNI-ADMM, a framework for large-scale composite convex optimization that facilitates theoretical analysis of both existing and new approximate ADMM schemes. Ge…

math.OC2022

Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets

Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra +1

Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible un…

cs.GT2022★ 16 cited

Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

Kshitij Kulkarni, Theo Diamandis, Tarun Chitra

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering user…

math.OC2022

Bounds on Efficiency Metrics in Photonics

Guillermo Angeris, Theo Diamandis, Jelena Vučković +1

In this paper, we present a method for computing bounds for a variety of efficiency metrics in photonics, such as the focusing efficiency or the mode purity. We focus on the specia…

stat.ML2021

A Wasserstein Minimax Framework for Mixed Linear Regression

Theo Diamandis, Yonina C. Eldar, Alireza Fallah +2

Multi-modal distributions are commonly used to model clustered data in statistical learning tasks. In this paper, we consider the Mixed Linear Regression (MLR) problem. We propose…

q-fin.ST2018

Ranking Causal Influence of Financial Markets via Directed Information Graphs

Theo Diamandis, Yonathan Murin, Andrea Goldsmith

A non-parametric method for ranking stock indices according to their mutual causal influences is presented. Under the assumption that indices reflect the underlying economy of a co…